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Florence Newspaper report: A historical overview of Italian soccer and its links with politics
Florence newspaper publishes this excellent essay written by Shelly Hansen. Shelly took the course Modern Italy: A Social Analysis with Professor Lorenzo Picchi at the Richmond University in Florence in the fall of 2007.
The modern game of soccer in Italy dates back to the Renaissance period when the English people (or, perhaps more specifically, a Turinese trader named Edoardo Bosio) introduced the sport to the country in 1887. Teams were composed of twenty-seven players, who were allowed to use both hands and feet to handle the ball.
The game was informal, but elegant none-the-less because the players who came down to the field, calcianti, were nobleman from the ages of 18 to 45 dressed in magnificent costumes of official colors. They named their sport soccer in custom.
The games were usually played during the famous Carnival, sometimes even in the piazza in front of the church of Santa Croce. During the same period in Venice, people were playing on round fields where goal lines were marked of by cement steps (Costantino 11).
In 1893, the oldest Italian soccer association was founded, “The Genoa Cricket and Foot-ball Club.” Five years later the city of Turin organized The Federazione Italiana del Foot-ball (Italian Soccer Federation). This association helped to streamline the game by overseeing activities and by providing an official set of rules to ensure the correct development of the sport.
On March 15, 1910, in the Arena of Milan, the Italian National Team played (and won 6 to 2) its first international competition against the French team (Costantino 11). After this victory, soccer gained popularity with people of all social classes and ages and soon every town had its own squad.
The period between 1934 and 1940 is referred to as the “golden years” of Italian soccer. Italy won the World Cup twice (1934 and 1938), an Olympic title (1936), and in thirty-six consecutive matches had twenty-four victories, six draws, and no defeats (Costantino 10). These successes also increased the popularity of the sport within Italian culture. As more and more people became interested and began to play, teams became more selective.
There was a need to categorize squads by their competitive level. At the bottom of the ladder are the neighborhood teams without much organization. At the top, the professional divisions are labeled as either A, B, C1 (a, b), or C2 (a, b, c). There are approximately eighteen teams belonging to la serie A (the “A” level), which is the most competitive division. These are the teams whose matches ignite tempers.
There are particularly strong rivalries between Milan and Inter, Fiorentina and Juventus, and Genoa and Sampadoria as teams fight for bragging rights. Fan violence is commonplace in large, important games and even in smaller, less important games when the two teams have a history.
This fanatic display of support in the form of slogans, songs, cheers, banners, instruments, and firecrackers has almost become a sport in its own right. Verona is full of gli ultras (super fans) and is the place where the well-known sport magazine Supertifo is published. Unfortunately, the violence of these fans can lead to injury and even death.
The affiliation between soccer and politics is found above all in the fan base. An increasingly obvious phenomenon emerges in a remarkable way in some soccer clubs. The extremist connotation is that of the right and that of the left. The curves, sections of the stadium on the top and bottom of the oval, are known for being much more rowdy. In addition, they tend to take the political stance of the left in a not-so-subtle way. Having seen the behavior of the ultras in the curves, one would say it is easy to see that they are utilized like an electoral river basin.
The political views of each set of fans are manifest mainly in the choruses, the banners, and the symbols used by the supporters, but it is also apparent in the distribution of sheets of political propaganda in the stadium. Some banners have been condemned from public use by fans and mass media institutions because of their racist messages or references to dictatorial figures like Stalin or Hitler.
Ian Hawkey writes, “Livorno are known as a communist club, whose fans don’t just take scarves, replica jerseys and loudhailers to matches, but go with Che Guevara in tow” (Di Canio…). To display these banners is to display Fascist sympathies or disrespect for the victims of the Holocaust. The goal of the supporters seems ever more related to politics, and less to soccer itself. However, in the last few years, the ultras seem to have found one common enemy independent of soccer and political faith: the police. The police have discovered that within some groups of ultra fans there are ties to extremist units and active insurrectional movements. This extremist attitude is one reason the spheres of soccer and politics will not soon be separated, if ever.
The world of the ultras is itself composed of very organized structures. They have their own clandestine radios, websites, official centers. Wisely, they have monopolized the souvenir vending system. They completely control the marketing and selling of the T-shirts, caps, flags, and other tacky, but highly profitable fan gear. More importantly, the ultras also control the sale of tickets for the games, often leaving the clubs hostage to threats if they do not accept the demands of the organization.
There are serious repercussions when a club does not cooperate. Ultras have been known to sabotage the field or terrorize the other fans and even the players themselves. Then, the financial responsibility of clean up and reconstruction after these disasters falls on the club. The ultras are aware of the power they have, which makes them dangerous.
To make matters worse, the most disappointing situation of all can occur: a star soccer player will allow himself to be compromised. It has happened before and will surely happen many more times, as long as rivalries outside of the game exist.
For example, Livornese forward, Christiano Lucarelli, an idol of the curve, often celebrates his goals with clenched-fist salutes made famous by those associated with Communism. Similarly, Paul Di Canio, former idol of the Latium curve, celebrates his goals with the one-armed Roman salute to fans of his team, Lazio. This gesture is most famously used by Italian fascists (Di Canio…).
For all the time, energy, and emotion the players put into their sport, they risk losing face every Sunday not only to sporting enemies, but also to political enemies. The ideologies of Di Canio and Lucarelli are apparent in their celebratory salutes and the players’ choice to use their prominence to espouse political views shows the strength of their beliefs. They are not at all afraid to display these opinions because they know they have the backing of their political-minded fans.
David Forgacs and Robert Lumley have another take on the reason athletic figures become political figures. They think it has to do with the lack of national identity within Italy.
“In place of formal institutions and official traditions, sport and entertainment have often been the principal source of a shared set of national cultural symbols; thus stars have on a variety of occasions taken on political meanings or been drawn into political conflict, and politicians have even more frequently presented themselves or been perceived as stars.
Not only Mussolini but Stalin, Togliatti, and in more recent times Sandro Pertini, Bettino Craxi, and Silvio Berlusconi have all been the objects of continuous public interest and adulation” (Forgacs and Lumley 312).
In addition to fans and players, businesspeople will often exploit the sport of soccer to further their careers and campaigns. Even if Italian sports are financed by the National Soccer Lottery and not the government, it is possible to use sport to gain popularity. “In the eighties, the Socialist minister of foreign affairs, Gianni de Michelis, was president of the Basketball League; Enzo Scotti, a Christian Democrat and frequent government minister, acted as president of the League of Cycling.
Giulio Andreotti himself, the longest-lasting post-war politician, for years presided over the football team of his electoral constituency, the city of Rome, bestowing favours and patronage” (McCarthy 173).
Silvio Berlusconi, who runs a monopoly on Italian television, is a perfect example. Since childhood, he had been an ardent fan of the famous Milanese football club, AC Milan (Ginsborg 53). Therefore, in March of 1986, he decided to purchase the ailing club and proceeded to transform it into the most successful club in the history of Italy. He acquired a new manager and new players and used his media background to advertise the team to national television audiences in an extremely extravagant, impressive manner.
Berlusconi was brilliant in his ability to exploit the popularity of AC Milan for his own political purposes. After getting into some financial trouble, he attempted to save himself from bankruptcy by creating a political party and running for president only three months before the elections.
He called his party Forza Italia (‘go for it Italy!’), which is derived from the chants of Italy’s national team. He even chose blue as the party’s signature color. Berlusconi claims that the political structure of Forza Italia is liberal, Catholic, social and popular, but he cannot help but make reference to Fascism as well (Ginsborg 176).
At the time Berlusconi was running, the Clean Hands campaign seemed almost like a political revolution, and many commentators heralded it as such. Italy’s ruling parties had effectively been purged as the government attempted to moralize itself.
A great void had been created in the center of Italian politics, and it was into this space that Silvio Berlusconi stepped. In his own words, soccer terminology of course, Berlusconi says, “I heard that the game was getting dangerous, and that it was all being played in the two penalty areas, with the midfield being left desperately empty” (Ginsborg 66).
In his victory of 1994, he managed to gain 21 percent of the vote, enough for his party to emerge as the largest political force in Italy’s fragmented party system. And, from the beginning, Forza Italia faithfully reflected the values and personnel of Berlusconi’s business empire.
The media tycoon lurks behind politics but is not in politics. He derives advantage from the actions of sympathetic politicians, and repays it with conspicuous and benevolent treatment of the same. There is a whole history to be written of the regulatory and legislative favours granted in modern democracies on these bases. Italy was no exception.
The Act of 1990 not only confirmed Berlusconi’s near monopoly of commercial television. It also allowed him to transmit ‘live’ and thus to compete with the RAI in its last area of prerogative: the making of the news” (Ginsborg 57).
Ginsborg is commenting on an event that took place in 1984. Berlusconi’s Fininvest group, which already owned channel five and Italia1, took over Retequattro (4). The three networks were blacked out in Rome, Turin, and Pescara on October 16 on the orders of the prefects.
In response, the Craxi government drafted a decree, nicknamed the “Decreto Berlusconi,” to enable the transmission in absence of regulatory laws (Forgacs 358). Later, the Broadcasting Act of 1990, “Legge Mammi,” gave legal ratification to a “mixed system” of public and private networks.
Despite its introduction, The Socialist Party seems to have defended Fininvest’s interests by warding off the threat of effective anti-monopoly legislation in the media industry. In return, Fininvest media gave plenty of interviews with PSI representatives, appearances on popular entertainment or talk shows, prominent coverage of issues championed by the party, and reduced rates for election advertising (Mignone 93).
This is just one example of the changes Berlusconi was able to make while in office, in order to protect himself and his interests. There is no better story of a man who used his image as a winner on the field to project the image of a winner in the political arena as well. T
here is no doubt that Berlusconi’s offers of tickets to sold-out games and promises of preferential treatment were a big help to both his business endeavors and his political campaign. After all, in Italy there is no better place to conduct public relations than from the VIP box of the soccer stadium.
Corruption is not entirely uncommon among politicians in government; “For example, a Milan politician from the Socialist party who was caught accepting bribes did not even bother to hide his computer lists of job candidates recommended by his electorate.
The lists, which included names of family members, favors granted, and political sponsors, was not proof of illegal behavior because it was not illegal to exchange favors for votes” (Mignone 43). This political behavior cannot be understood by the American mind that prefers everything in black and white because everything about it is debatable (Forgacs 413).
Bettino Craxi had a way of manipulating others in order to get what he wanted. In the 1980’s, he was the leader of the Socialist party and he encouraged building contractors in Milan to make regular periodic payments, explaining that such payments would be less easily identifiable as bribes.
The Communist Party (PCI) also had its ways of obtaining financing. In return for contributions, councilors in regions and communes would make sure that the cooperatives received a share of public contracts (Ginsborg 43). Still, it is most interesting to analyze the special connection between this sort of corruption and the world of sports, as it is through sports that many politicians get their start.
The connection between politics and the fans, players, and clubs (and those people who own and direct the actions of the clubs) has been investigated. With this investigation, it is evident that soccer has been used throughout the history of contemporary Italy as a tool to gain political consensus.
As long as soccer retains the popularity it enjoys in Italy, Europe, and increasingly, abroad, and as long as there is political discord within the country, the sport will forever be saturated with people wanting to exploit it.
Works cited:
Allen, Beverly, and Mary Russo. Revisioning Italy, National Identity and Global
Culture. Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.
Costantino, Mario, and Lawrence Gambella. The Italian Way, Aspects of Behavior, Attitude, and Customs of the Italians. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1996.
“Di Canio vs. Lucarelli: An Ideological Battle Seen in Salutes.” Culture of Soccer. May
1, 2007. http://cultureofsoccer.com.
Forgacs, David, and Robert Lumley. Italian Cultural Studies, an introduction. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Ginsborg, Paul. Silvio Berlusconi, Television, Power and Patrimony. New York, New York: Verso, 2004.
McCarthy, P. Italy since 1945: “Sport” (by Stefano Pivato). Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Mignone, Mario B. Italy Today, At the Crossroads of the New Millennium. New York, New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 1998.
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